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Beyond The "Plastic Reindeer Rule": The Curious




The United States Supreme Court has long wrestled with the
task of giving meaning to the Establishment Clause1 of the First
Amendment of the Constitution in modern American society. De-
spite over forty years of labor,2 the Court's efforts to fashion a
clear, predictable and consistent framework for drawing the line
between government s and religion have been largely unsatisfying.
Scholarly commentary critical of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence abounds.' Even individual justices on the Court have
expressed dissatisfaction and chagrin at the development of consti-
tutional doctrine in this area.3
* B.A. University of Pittsburgh, 1974; J.D. Duquesne University School of Law 1977.
Second Assistant Solicitor, County of Allegheny. Co-Counsel in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union.
1. The Establishment Clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The modern era of Supreme Court interpretation of the Establishment Clause be-
gan with the case of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior to Everson,
there were only a handful of cases involving the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Cochran v.
Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1929); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918);
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
3. The Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Everson case. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8,
15-16.
4. See, e.g., Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Es-
tablishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in
the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997 (1986); Valauri, The
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PrrT. L. REV. 83 (1986);
Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Estab-
lishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986); Kurland, The Religion
Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 478, 639, (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence is "embarrassing"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91
(1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess
our cases ... dealing with the Establishment Clause"); Id. at 107 (Rehniquist, J., dissent-
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One particularly problematic area of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence has involved the display of religious symbols under pub-
lic auspices. In March, 1984, the United States Supreme Court
handed down a major decision in this sensitive area. In the case of
Lynch v. Donnelly6 , a deeply divided Court held that the City of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island's inclusion of a nativity scene in an an-
nual holiday display did not violate the Establishment Clause. The
highly critical reaction to the Lynch decision echoed the discontent
voiced over the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.7
Moreover, rather than ending litigation over the question of reli-
gious displays under governmental auspices, Lynch only served to
increase it. Confusion over the Lynch case reigned as various fed-
eral courts throughout the nation labored to apply Lynch to dis-
plays in different physical contexts.8
With the grant of certiorari in the case of County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Unions, the United States Supreme
Court was presented with an excellent opportunity to settle the
controversy over the scope and meaning of Lynch and to provide
clear guidelines for future displays of religious symbols. Moreover,
with the ascension of Anthony Kennedy to the Court,10 County of
Allegheny provided the vehicle to reassess and to change the much
maligned three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman" test, the Court's
ing) ("Our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified."); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)(suggest a clarification of Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine).
6. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L.REv. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) ("For a generation, one crite-
rion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether the theory explains why the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was correct. In my
view, a criterion for an acceptable theory of the religion clauses is whether that theory ex-
plains why the Court's decision in Lynch was wrong."); Braveman, The Establishment
Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 46 MD. L.REv. 352, 353 (1986) (Lynch ap-
proach "devastating" to first amendment doctrine); Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Case: An
Error in Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L.REv. 837; L. Pfeffer, Religion, State and the Burger
Court, 124 (1984) (equating Lynch to the Dred Scott decision). Not all of the reaction to the
Lynch decision was critical. See, Fairchild, The Case for the Creche, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J.
459 (1985); Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 B.
Y. U. L. REV. 509.
8. See infra, notes 59-130 and accompanying text.
9. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1988).
10. President Reagan nominated Justice Kennedy, a judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on November 11, 1987. Justice Kennedy was confirmed by
the Senate by a vote of 97-to-0 on February 3, 1988 and sworn in on February 18, 1988.
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under Lemon, a government practice or statute is permissible
under the Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose, if it neither advances nor inhib-
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longstanding analytical framework for deciding Establishment
Clause cases.
Judged by these expectations, County of Allegheny was a major
disappointment. Although the decision in County of Allegheny
marked the acceptance of a reformulation of one of the prongs of
the Lemon test, the tri-partite framework still remained in tact as
the accepted method of Establishment Clause analysis. Moreover,
by drawing even finer distinctions between what is constitutionally
permissible and impermissible, the Court in County of Allegheny
failed to provide any meaningful guidance concerning future holi-
day displays.
This article is divided into four parts. Sections Two and Three
provide the necessary background to the County of Allegheny case
by reviewing the Lynch case and the varying interpretations of the
scope of Lynch within the lower federal courts. Section Four exam-
ines in close detail the County of Allegheny case and the principal
opinions connected with that case. Section Five examines the prac-
tical implications of the County of Allegheny case. This section
concludes that the Supreme Court's new analysis for public dis-
plays of religious symbols adopted in County of Allegheny, which
can best be described as "beyond the plastic reindeer rule,"'" is
destined to produce inconsistent and varying results in practice.
II. LYNCH v. DONNELLY
For over forty years, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island er-
ected a lighted Christmas display.1 3 The display, which was situ-
ated in a private park located in the City's downtown shopping
district,"' was comprised of a number of items, many of which were
traditional secular Christmas decorations.' 5 Included in the fore-
its religion in its principal or primary effect, and it does not foster an excessive entangle-
ment with religion. Id. at 612-13. Except on two occasions, the Lemon test has been applied
in all of the Court's Establishment Clause cases. See, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983) (legislative prayers constitutional under historical analysis); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982) (strict scrutiny analysis applied).
12. See infra, note 85-86 and accompanying text.
13. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.R.I. 1981).
14. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1154.
15. The district court listed the following items in the display:
a "talking" wishing well; Santa's House, inhabited by a live Santa who distributed
candy; a grouping of caroler/musician figures in old-fashioned dress, standing on a
low platform surrounded by six large artificial candles; a small "village" composed of
four houses and a church; four large, five-pointed stars covered with small white elec-
tric lights; three painted wooden Christmas tree cutouts; live, 40' Christmas tree
strung with lights; a spray of reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, set on an elevated run-
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ground of the City's holiday display was a nativity scene or
creche.1" The nativity scene consisted of life-sized figurines of the
traditional characters: the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels,
shepherds, kings and animals. 17 The entire display was not only
owned and erected by city workers but also illuminated with lights
and electricity paid for by the City.18 Each year the display was
opened with elaborate ceremonies conducted by the Mayor.19
The plaintiffs, several residents of the City and members of the
American Civil Liberties Union, sued to require the removal of the
nativity scene from the City's holiday display. The district court
declared the nativity scene display unconstitutional and perma-
nently enjoined the City from continuing the practice.20 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals, by a vote of two-to-one, affirmed the dis-
trict court .2 Although it used a different analysis than did the dis-
trict court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed
the district court, holding that the City could not demonstrate any
way; a long garland hung from candy-stripped poles; cutout letters, colored in fluores-
cent paint, that spell "SEASON'S GREETINGS"; 21 Cutout figures representing
such varied characters as a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot and a teddy bear; the
nativity scene at issue in this case.
Id. at 1155. Chief Justice Burger provided a less comprehensive description in his opinion.
See, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 671.
16. Creche is a French word meaning manger or crib. Webster, NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953). The term is used to refer to a representation of the stable in
Bethlehem where Christ was born using figurines of the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, the
shepherds, magi and barnyard animals. The practice of displaying nativity scenes purport-
edly originated with St. Francis of Assisi in 1233, who arranged animals around a manger
during a Christmas Eve mass in order to recreate the humble origins of Christ's birth. See,
FOLEY, CHRISTMAS THE WORLD OVER, 47, 64-65 (1963). The tradition of nativity scene dis-
plays was brought to America in the eighteenth century by Moravian Protestants. See,
KAINEN, AMERICA'S CHRISTMAS HERITAGE 73-75 (1969).
17. The district court gave the following description of the Pawtucket creche:
The figures in the nativity scene are approximately life sized. They include kings
bearing gifts, shepherds, animals, angels, and Mary and Joseph kneeling near the
manger in which the baby lies with arms spread in apparent benediction. All of the
figures face the manger in which the baby lies; several have their hands folded and/or
are kneeling. The figures' poses, coupled with their facial expressions, connote an at-
mosphere of devotion, worship, and awe. The stable is,inexplicably, shored up with
two hockey sticks. Some of the figures are chipped, and the paint on several is
peeling.
Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1156.
18. Id.
19. Id. According to the district court, the Santa Claus arrived at the park in a fire
truck. With the Mayor, he would throw a switch illuminating all of the lights in the Park
and at City Hall, some 300 feet away. Id.
20. Id. at 1181.
21. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
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compelling governmental interest in erecting a nativity scene.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of
the court of appeals.23
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger commenced his
opinion by criticizing the Jeffersonian metaphor of the Constitu-
tion's alleged creation of a wall of separation between church and
state. 24 The Chief Justice stated that the Constitution "affirma-
tively mandates accommodation" between government and reli-
gion.25 The Chief Justice then proceeded to describe a number of
examples of official governmental acknowledgments of the role of
religion in American life.2 6
Noting that the Court consistently has declined to take an abso-
lutist view of the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger de-
scribed the Court's analysis of Establishment Clause issues as es-
sentially "line-drawing. "27 In drawing the permissible line of
conduct in this area, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court
"often found it useful" to utilize the three-pronged Lemon test.2'
22. Id. at 1035. The court of appeals majority based its decision upon the Supreme
Court's case of Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Supreme Court uti-
lized a strict scrutiny test to invalidate a state law denying an exemption from certain regis-
tration and reporting requirements for religious organization receiving a certain percentage
of contributions from non-members. 456 U.S. at 252.
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. Thomas Jefferson's statement of a wall of separation be-
tween church and state was made in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802.
The wall of separation language in Jefferson's letter was first used by the Court in Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879), a case involving a Free Exercise Clause challenge
to a federal law banning polygamy. The wall of separation metaphor was reintroduced by
Justice Black in his opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Chief
Justice Rehnquist has been the principal critic of the "wall of separation" metaphor as a
shorthand explanation of the Establishment Clause. In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), then Justice Rehnquist declared: "The wall of separation be-
tween church and State is a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned." 472 U.S. at 107.
25. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
26. Id. at 675. The examples cited by Chief Justice Burger included Thanksgiving
Proclamations, federal statutes making Thanksgiving and Christmas national holidays, paid
chaplains for Congress and the military, the "In God We Trust" motto, the inclusion of the
phrase "One nation under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, government supported art mu-
seums displaying artworks depicting religious events, the Supreme Court's frieze including
Moses with the Ten Commandments and proclamations for a National Day of Prayer, Jew-
ish Heritage Weekand the Jewish High Holy Days. Id. at 675-77.
27. Id. at 678.
28. Id. at 679. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's application of
the three-pronged Lemon test was less than vigorous. See infra note 46 and accompanying
text. Many commentators support Brennan's contention. See, e.g., Braveman, The Estab-
lishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REV. 352 (1986); Of
Crosses and Creches: Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious
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Although emphasizing that the Court was not necessarily bound to
apply Lemon in all Establishment Clause cases, the majority ex-
amined the Pawtucket display in light of the Lemon criteria.2 9
Addressing initially the issue of whether the Pawtucket nativity
scene had a secular purpose, Chief Justice Burger declared that the
district court had erred by focusing exclusively on the religious na-
ture of the creche. "Focus exclusively on the religious component
of any activity," the Chief Justice declared, "would inevitably lead
to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause." 30 Thus, in the
Chief Justice's view, the focus of the Lemon inquiry in this case
must be the creche within the context of the Christmas season."
Viewed in this perspective, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test was satisfied because
the nativity scene display was sponsored by the City to celebrate
the Holiday and to depict the historical origins of an event long
recognized as a national holiday.32
The Chief Justice next stated that the nativity scene in Lynch
did not have a primary effect of advancing religion.3 In making
this determination, the Court stated that the inclusion of the na-
tivity scene conferred no greater benefit to religion than those
practices which were found constitutional in prior cases.34 While
conceding that the display of a nativity scene would advance reli-
gion "in a sense," the Court nevertheless found such aid or benefit
to be "indirect, remote and incidental.
3 5
Finally, the majority found that the nativity scene in Lynch did
Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477 (1986). Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down The Barri-
ers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985).
29. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
30. Id. at 679.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 681.
33. Id.
34. Id. These practices included the expenditure of public funds for textbooks for chil-
dren attending parochial schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); trans-
portation of children to parochial schools, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
grants for building construction at church-sponsored colleges and universities, Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); non-categorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and
universities, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); tax-exemptions for
church properties, Walz v. Tax Commission 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sunday closing laws, Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); release time for religious education, Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1957); and legislative prayers, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983). One commentator critical of the Lynch decision called Chief Justice Burger's com-
parison of practices an "any more than" test. Van Alystne, Trends in the Supreme Court:
Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Connelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770.
35. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
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not create an excessive entanglement between government and re-
ligion. 6 The majority in Lynch noted the absence of any excessive
administrative entanglements between the government and reli-
gion surrounding the erection of the City's nativity scene.3 7 The
Court added that in the absence of such administrative entangle-
ment, claims of political divisiveness alone were insufficient to in-
validate otherwise permissible government conduct. 8
In conclusion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that banning the
creche from the municipal display in question "would be a stilted
overreaction."39 The Chief Justice labeled the notion that a munic-
ipal display of a nativity scene posed a real danger of establish-
ment of a state church as "far-fetched indeed."40
Although joining in the majority opinion of the Court in Lynch,
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion suggesting a clarifica-
tion of Establishment Clause doctrine based upon the notion of
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion. 41 The Justice
initially stated that the purpose of including the nativity scene in
the Pawtucket display was the "celebration of the public holiday
through its traditional symbols."' 2 She concluded: "Celebration of
public holidays, which have cultural significance even if they also
have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose."' S
Justice O'Connor further declared that the display of a creche
did not actually communicate a message of government endorse-
ment of Christianity. While noting "the religious and indeed secta-
rian significance of the creche," the Justice found that "the overall
holiday setting . . . negates any message of endorsement of that
content."4
Justice Brennan wrote the chief dissenting opinion in the case.4
In his opinion, the Justice contended initially that the Pawtucket
nativity scene could not meet a "vigorous application" of the
36. Id. at 684.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 686.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 691
43. Id.
44. Id. at 692.
45. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Ste-
vens. In his short dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the majority had misapplied the
Lemon test and permitted the "misuse of a sacred symbol." Id. at 726-27.
1990
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Lemon test." He further stated that Pawtucket's valid secular
objectives of celebrating the holiday and promoting retail sales and
goodwill could be "readily accomplished" without inclusion of a
creche."7 The addition of the religious symbol to the display, Jus-
tice Brennan argued, demonstrated that the government's purpose
was to deliver a clear sectarian message: Keep Christ in
Christmas.' 8
Justice Brennan went on to state that the primary effect of the
City's nativity scene was "to place the government's imprimatur of
approval on the particular religious belief exemplified by the
creche.' 49 By singling out a particular religion for special treat-
ment, Justice Brennan declared that Pawtucket was promoting
"religious chauvinism" by conveying a message to other religious
groups and atheists that their views were unworthy of recognition
and support.50
Concluding his Lemon analysis, Justice Brennan noted that the
inclusion of the creche "pose[d] a significant threat of fostering ex-
cessive entanglement." 51 In Justice Brennan's view, the display of
one religion's symbol was bound to produce demands from other
religions for inclusion of their symbols.52 The Justice opined that
the likely result of local officials' attempts to accommodate such
demands was community divisiveness along religious lines.53
Justice Brennan's dissent also attacked the principal arguments
advanced by the Lynch majority to support their conclusion that
the Pawtucket display satisfied Lemon. The Justice maintained
that "it blinks reality" to claim that the context of the season can
mask the inherent religious significance of the creche.5 ' Addition-
ally, Justice Brennan rejected as a "faulty syllogism" the majority
position that once the Court finds designation of Christmas as a
public holiday constitutionally acceptable then every form of gov-
ernmental association with the holiday is also constitutional.5 This
argument was "fundamentally flawed," in Justice Brennan's view,
because it risked placing "the prestige, power and financial support
46. Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 699
48. Id. at 700-01.
49. Id. at 701
50. Id.
51. Id. at 702.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 706.
55. Id. at 709.
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of a civil authority in the service of a particular faith."56 The Jus-
tice concluded his dissenting opinion by criticizing the majority's
uncritical approval of the notion of governmental acknowledgment
of religion 57 and the majority's use and analysis of history to justify
the constitutionality of the creche. 8
III. POST-LYNCH CASE LAW
Despite the seeming clarity of the Supreme Court's holding in
Lynch that a municipal nativity scene erected during the Christ-
mas holiday season did not constitute any real danger of an estab-
lishment of religion, the Lynch decision was subjected to a variety
of interpretations within the lower federal courts.
A. The Narrow Interpretation of Lynch
Taking their cue perhaps from Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Lynch, several federal courts hearing challenges to holi-
day displays subsequent to Lynch gave that decision a very narrow
interpretation."s These courts seized upon such things as Chief
Justice Burger's detailed description of the Pawtucket display to
justify distinguishing Lynch on its facts, reapplying the Lemon test
and finding a nativity scene in a different physical context viola-
56. Id. at 711.
57. Id. at 714. While Justice Brennan conceded that acknowledgment of religion, he
viewed governmental acknowledgment as essentially falling into three limited categories: (1)
affording opportunities to practice religion such as declaring December 25th a public holi-
day; (2) practices which were once religious but which now have a secular purpose like Sun-
day closing laws; and (3) official public practices such as the "In God We Trust" motto and
the references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance which constitute a "ceremonial deism". Id.
at 714-16.
58. Id. at 718. Brennan's criticism of the majority's historical argument was two-fold.
First, Brennan argued that the Court had "until today, consistently limited its historical
inquiry to the particular practice under review." Id. at 719. Secondly, Brennan declared that
the majority had failed to follow the historical analysis utilized in such cases such as Mc-
Gowan, Walz and Marsh. According to Brennan, these cases validated practices accepted
over the entire course of the Nation's history. Brennan observed that the practice of dis-
playing nativity scenes was "a comparatively recent phenomenon" and thus could not be
reconciled with the long settled practice evidence required by the Court in prior cases. Id. at
720.
59. Justice Brennan seemed to invite such treatment of the holding in Lynch by
declaring:
[Tihe Court reaches an essentially narrow result which turns largely upon the partic-
ular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene appeared. The
Court's decision implicitly leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality of
the public display on public property of a creche standing alone, or the public display
of other distinctively religious symbols such as a cross.
Id. at 694-95.
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tive of the Establishment Clause. The cases which gave Lynch a
narrow scope fell into two categories. The first category of cases
created an "unadorned creche" exception to Lynch. This particular
category of post-Lynch case was exemplified by Burelle v. City of
Nashua6 °  and American Civil Liberties Union v. City of
Birmingham."
In City of Nashua, a taxpayer filed suit against the City of
Nashua, New Hampshire for permitting a non-profit merchants or-
ganization to erect a nativity scene on City Hall plaza, an area in
front of the town's governmental offices.6 2 In enjoining the prac-
tice, Chief Judge Devine reviewed the Lynch decision and several
post-Lynch display cases and agreed with the view that Lynch was
bound to its particular facts.63 Judge Devine found as a factual
matter that the creche stood alone, unaccompanied by either secu-
lar Christmas symbols or a disclaimer sign renouncing any govern-
mental interest in the religious aspect of the display."' Under these
circumstances, Judge Devine found the City failed the Lemon test,
ruling that "the display of the creche indicates that the municipal
government of Nashua believes that the Trinitarian theory of
Christianity is a favored religious practice."65
In City of Birmingham, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
confronted with a display essentially similar to the one in City of
Nashua. Each year from late November to early January the City
of Birmingham, Michigan erected a nativity scene. The display,
which was unaccompanied by any other figurines or decorations,
60. 599 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.H. 1984)
61. 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
62. City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. at 794. The district court indicated that the City of
Nashua owned and erected the nativity scene. At the time of the initiation of the lawsuit,
the City conveyed title to the nativity scene to a group called Heart of Nashua Foundation,
Inc. and granted the Foundation a license to erect the display. Id.
63. Id. at 795-96. Judge Devine specifically reviewed the cases of McCreary v. Stone,
739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) and American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmington, 588
F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich.1984). Judge Devine declared that he had read and re-read Lynch
and concluded that the Birmingham court's interpretation of Lynch was the better one.
City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. at 795-96.
64. Id. at 797. The City argued that the nativity scene was not unaccompanied by
secular decorations and pointed to lights and trees erected by the Foundation and lights and
a large sign reading NOEL on the second floor of the City Hall. Id. at 796. Judge Devine,
however, determined that these decorations were too far away from the nativity scene and
thus "do not serve to overshadow, balance or neutralize the symbol of the Trinitarian doc-
trine of Christianity." Id. at 797.
65. Id. at 796-97. Interestingly, Judge Devine's injunction order provided that the City
could continue to have a municipal nativity display if it also erected a disclaimer sign. Id.
454 Vol. 28:445
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was located on public property in front of City Hall. 6 The entire
display was owned by the city and was erected, illuminated, main-
tained and dismantled by public employees at public expense.
6 7
Distinguishing the Birmingham display from the one in Lynch, the
district court enjoined the City's display as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 8 By a two-to-one vote, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.9
In his opinion for the majority, Judge Lively rejected the city's
argument that the absence of other Christmas decorations was un-
important. The Judge declared: "In our opinion, the city-owned
and city-sponsored nativity scene sends quite a different message
when it stands alone as the only clearly identifiable symbol chosen
by the city to mark its contribution to the celebration. ' 70 Utilizing
the language of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch,
Judge Lively stated that an unadorned creche sent a message to
non-Christians that they were outsiders, non-favored members of
the community.
7 1
Judge Nelson's dissenting opinion in City of Birmingham ridi-
culed the majority's reading of Lynch as creating a "St. Nicholas
too" test. Judge Nelson wrote:
The lesson comes down to this: a city is free to display such a scene at
Christmas if it is balanced by symbols which, although they may also be
associated with Christmas, are considered secular in origin. If enough such
symbols are displayed, the manger scene will pass constitutional muster. It
may be convenient to think of this as a "St. Nicholas too" test-a city can




The application of such a test may prove troublesome in practice. Will a
mere Santa Claus suffice, or must there also be a Mrs. Claus? Are reindeer
needed? If so, will one do or must there be a full compliment of eight? Or is
it now nine? Where in the works of Story, Cooley or Tribe are we to find
answers to constitutional questions such as these? The point I am trying to
make is a serious one, of course.
66. City of Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. at 1338.
67. Id.
68. Id. 1339
69. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir.
1986).
70. Id. at 1567.
71. Id. at 1566, quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
72. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1569 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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The symbolism of Christmas in the 20th Century A.D. continues to incorpo-
rate many pagan elements, and Christmas would hardly be Christmas, for
most Americans, without them. But I question whether it is appropriate for
federal courts to tell the towns and villages of America how much paganism
they need to put into their Christmas decorations, and I am reluctant to
attribute to the Supreme Court an intent to point us in that direction by
implication.3
The second type of case giving Lynch a very narrow interpreta-
tion is what can be called the public property exception. This par-
ticular rationale for narrowing the scope of Lynch was advanced in
the Seventh Circuit's decision in American Jewish Congress v.
City of Chicago.4
For thirty years, the City of Chicago erected or permitted the
erection of a nativity scene in the lobby of the Chicago City-
County Building.75 The scene consisted of several white plaster
figures, each under twelve inches in height, displayed on a plat-
form decorated with tree branches strung with miniature holiday
lights and a banner reading "On Earth Peace-Good Will Toward
Men."'76 Within ten to ninety feet away from the nativity scene,
the City erected a number of other decorations. They included:
eight Christmas wreaths, a decorated Christmas tree, a mechanical
Santa Claus with two reindeer and sleigh, and banners and cartons
associated with a food drive for needy citizens. 7 In addition to the
decorations, the City attached six disclaimer signs to the nativity
scene. The signs read: "Donated by the Chicago Plasterer's Insti-
tute-this exhibit is neither sponsored nor endorsed by the Gov-
ernment of the City of Chicago.
'78
A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed a district court's ruling that the Chicago display did not vi-
olate the Constitution.79 Writing for the majority, Judge Flaum
stated that the district court had erred by concluding that Lynch
was controlling in the case.80 The Chicago holiday display was dif-
ferent from the Lynch display, Judge Flaum opined, in two re-
73. Id.
74. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
75. At one time, the City of Chicago owned the nativity scene. After the commence-
ment of a lawsuit several years prior to the American Jewish Congress action, title to the
figurines was transferred to the Chicago Plasterer's Institute, a private entity. Chicago, 827
F.2d at 122-23.
76. Id. at 122.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 123.
79. Id. at 122.
80. Id. at 125.
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spects. The first difference was that the nativity scene in City of
Chicago was "self-contained, rather than one element of a larger
display."8 The second difference was that the Chicago display was
located within a government building.8 2 Given these differences,
Judge Flaum concluded that Lynch was "plainly" distinguishable
and an analysis of the display under Lemon was required.
8 3
Applying the Lemon test to the particulars of the Chicago dis-
play, the City of Chicago majority held that the display had the
effect of advancing religion because the nativity scene at issue
communicated governmental endorsement of religion.84 This im-
permissible message of endorsement, the majority maintained, was
created simply by the display's location on government property.
Judge Flaum explained:
Because City Hall is so plainly under government ownership and control,
every display and activity in the building is implicitly marked with the
stamp of government approval. The presence of a nativity scene in the
lobby, therefore, inevitably creates a clear and strong impression that the
local government tacitly endorses Christianity. 6
Moreover, Judge Flaum stated that the message of endorsement
created by the display of "an unequivocal Christian symbol" on
government property existed not only in reality but on a symbolic
level as well. Judge Flaum declared:
Like the nativity scene itself, City Hall is a symbol-a symbol of govern-
ment power. The very phrase "City Hall" is commonly used as a metaphor
for government. A creche in City Hall thus brings together Church and
State in a manner that unmistakably suggests their alliance. The display at
issue in this case advanced religion by sending a message to the people of
Chicago that the city approved of Christianity."
Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion in City of Chicago was
more critical of the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch than the
majority opinion's conclusions. Judge Easterbrook complained
that:
Th[e Lynch] decision, like others requiring multi-factor balances, gives
judges of the inferior federal courts fits. The Court avoided creating a rule
about the treatment of religious symbols and instead announced that judges
81. Id.
82. Id. at 126.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 128. The court of appeals initially concluded that the Chicago display did
not violate the purpose prong of Lemon. Id. at 127.




should examine each symbol's context. But which items of the context
matter?
When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive, when we must juggle
incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt."
Judge Easterbrook's dissent argued that governmental endorse-
ment could not be implied simply because of a display's location
on government property or because of the absence of accompany-
ing secular holiday decorations.8 After examining closely what he
called governmental "religious speech" since the founding of the
nation, Judge Easterbrook contended that "force or funds are es-
sential ingredients of an establishment [of religion]." 8 9 Because
Chicago's creche display lacked these coercive elements, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that there was no unconstitutional
establishment."
B. The Broad Interpretation of Lynch
Not all of the lower federal courts which had occasion to inter-
pret the Lynch decision gave that case a narrow reading. In Mc-
Creary v. Stone,91 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
display of a privately owned nativity scene. In McCreary, two citi-
zens organizations92 sought permission from the Board of Trustees
of Scarsdale, New York to erect as in previous years a nativity
scene in a park located in the Village's central retail business dis-
trict.' When the Board of Trustees denied permission for the dis-
play, the citizens groups commenced separate actions against the
Board seeking damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York entered judgment for the municipality and the citizens
87. Id. at 128-29 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 130-31. Judge Easterbrook was especially critical of the majority's view that
location on public property is per se indicative of governmental endorsement. To refute this
notion, Judge Easterbrook recounted an episode where an artist exhibited an art work criti-
cal of Chicago's then Mayor. Attempts by the City to remove the artwork were met with an
injunction. Id. at 132.
89. Id. at 137.
90. Id. at 140.
91. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
92. The citizens organizations were called "the Citizens' Group" and the Scarsdale
Creche Committee. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 717-18.




In the court of appeals, the Village of Scarsdale ("Village") con-
tended that its denial of permission to display a nativity scene in
the traditional public forum of the village's park served a compel-
ling state interest of avoiding a violation of the Establishment
Clause.95 Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit panel repeat-
edly cited Lynch and declared that the erection of the display
would not contravene the Establishment Clause."' Most signifi-
cantly, the Court rejected the Village's attempt to distinguish the
Lynch decision on its facts.9
The court of appeals labeled as "erroneous" the Village's initial
argument that Lynch could be distinguished based upon the par-
ticular physical context of a display. The Court declared, "The Su-
preme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case [Lynch] based
upon the physical context within which the display of the creche
was situated .. ."98
Further, the McCreary Court dismissed the claim that Lynch
was distinguishable because the creche in Lynch was displayed on
private property. The court of appeals stated: "We fail to find sub-
stantiality in this asserted private/public land distinction when
comparing the creche in Lynch with either creche in this case. ' "
C. The 1988 Holiday Cases
While the County of Allegheny case awaited argument before
the United States Supreme Court, litigation over the constitution-
ality of holiday displays intensified throughout the nation. In an
overwhelming majority of the cases decided during the pendency
of County of Allegheny, the holiday displays were determined to
be constitutional.
In Doe v. City of Warren,100 the City of Warren Michigan's in-
clusion of a nativity scene and menorah as part of a holiday dis-
play on the front lawn of city hall was challenged as a violation of
94. McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
95. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 723. Supreme Court caselaw provides that a content-based
restriction on speech in a public forum can be justified only upon the showing of a compel-
ling governmental interest and that the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
96. McCreary, 739 F.2d.at 724-28, 730.
97. Id. at 728.
98. Id. at 729.
99. Id.
100. No. 87-30084 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 1988).
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the Establishment Clause. 0 1 In upholding the constitutionality of
the display, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
maintained that the fact-specific interpretation of Lynch given by
other courts was exaggerated. The Court declared:
[T]he Supreme Court in Lynch contemplated a flexible analysis in deciding
holiday display disputes, in which the 'effect' prong of the Lemon test must
be tempered by the recognition of the Christmas season and the secular and
religious history underlying its celebration. In this framework, the symbolic-
counting and geographic placement factors relied on in the circuit opinions
would have some relevance, yet would not in and of themselves dictate the
end result.102
A display similar to the one upheld in the City of Warren case
was upheld by a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Mather v. Village of Mundelein.03  In Village of
Mundelein, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court's ruling
that the Village's display of a nativity scene along with other secu-
lar holiday decorations on the lawn of its village violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. 104 In a per curiam opinion, the panel majority
in Village of Mundelein declared that the holiday display in Vil-
lage of Mundelein was more like the display upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Lynch rather than the display disallowed in the
Seventh Circuit in City of Chicago.05 The panel majority con-
cluded their per curiam opinion by expressing the hope that the
Supreme Court would decide the County of Allegheny case "in a
way that diminishes the role of architectural judgment in constitu-
tional law."'0 6
American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkinson'07 presented a con-
stitutional challenge to a slightly different type of holiday display.
In Wilkinson, the State of Kentucky built, with public funds, a
structure resembling a biblical-age stable on the grounds of the
Kentucky State Capitol Building in Frankfort. The stable was used
by various groups invited by the state to participate in pageants
101. Id. at -.
102. Id. at -.
103. 864 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 1293.
105. Id. at 1292. In an interesting turn of events, Judge Easterbrook, the dissenting
judge in City of Chicago was part of the two-to-one panel majority in Village of Mundelein.
Judge Flaum, the author of the majority opinion in City of Chicago, was the dissenting
judge in Village of Mundelein.
106. 864 F.2d at 1293.
107. 701 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.Ky. 1988).
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reenacting the birth of Christ. '0 8 Other secular decorations were on
the grounds, but not within one hundred yards of the nativity
scene. 109
The District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky first re-
viewed the Lynch decision and the later applications of Lynch in
various federal appellate courts. In the district court's view, the
Lynch decision's context of the season analysis and the City of
Birmingham's physical setting analysis served as the correct basis
to determine the constitutionality of the Kentucky display.110 In
adopting this framework, the district court specifically rejected the
view set forth in the City of Chicago case that the location of a
religious display at the seat of government constituted an endorse-
ment of religion.' The district court interpreted the City of Bir-
mingham case as requiring the presence of some secular decora-
tions near the nativity display."12 Relying upon observations made
during a view of the display, the district court concluded that the
decorations around the Capitol grounds were sufficient to satisfy
the City of Birmingham requirements.'3
Although the district court rejected the plaintiffs' basic conten-
tion that the state capitol display was unconstitutional, the Court
did impose conditions regarding the display. Drawing upon the
Second Circuit Court's decision in McCreary v. Stone, the district
court required the state to erect a disclaimer sign in front of the
display."14 The court also required the state to adopt a written pol-
icy regarding the availability of the grounds for ceremonies, pag-
eants and displays, public notice of that policy and to defray pub-
lic expenditures for the display from private contributions." 5
While litigation involving holiday displays has been primarily
conducted in the federal courts, a significant pre-County of Alle-
gheny decision was handed down in a state court. The case of Ok-
rand v. City of Los Angeles" 6 involved the constitutionality of the
display of the Katowitz menorah"7 in the rotunda of the Los An-
108. Id. at 1298-99.
109. 109. Id. at 1301. These decorations included a thirty-foot Christmas tree.
110. Id. at 1310.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1311.
113. Id. at 1311-12.
114. Id. at 1312-13.
115. Id. at 1313-14.
116. 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. Jan. 26, 1989).
117. The Katowitz menorah was a specially crafted menorah presented to the Jewish
congregation of the Great Synagogue in Katowicz, Poland. Id. at 914. See generally infra,
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geles City Hall. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals rejected arguments based upon the City
of Chicago, City of Birmingham and County of Allegheny cases
that the Los Angeles display was unconstitutional because of its
location or lack of secular decorations. 118 In particular, the Court
of Appeals noted that the rotunda of City Hall, an area used for
historical, cultural and artistic displays in the past, provided a
"museum-like setting" which negated any message of endorsement
of the Jewish religion.119 Additionally, the Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument that the menorah display violated the Califor-
nia Constitution's "preference test. 1 20 The Court stated that the
menorah was more of a museum piece than a symbol of religious
worship. Consequently its display near a Christmas tree indicated
no preference for religion. 21
The case of Smith v. Lindstrom22 was the only case decided
during the pendency of County of Allegheny that found a holiday
display to be unconstitutional. In Smith, a group of local citizens
sued to enjoin the erection of a nativity scene on the front lawn of
a county office building in downtown Charlottesville, Virginia. The
Smith case arose in December, 1987 when the local Jaycees asked
and were granted permission by the Albemarle County Supervisors
to erect a nativity scene on the lawn of the county office building.
The creche erected by the Jaycees was unaccompanied by any
other seasonal decorations. 23 No government funds were expended
in erecting the creche. 24 Additionally, a disclaimer sign indicating
private sponsorship was placed near it.115
In declaring the Charlottesville Jaycee nativity display unconsti-
tutional, District Judge Michael initially looked to the Lynch deci-
sion for guidance. Judge Michael stated that Lynch commanded an
examination "in a particularistic manner [of] the effect of the
creche in the context before us.'12 6 Concluding that the facts of the
note 147.
118. Id. at 915-16.
119. Id. at 920. The rotunda had been the site of numerous displays and exhibits of a
historical, cultural and artistic nature. Id. at 914. The Katowitz menorah was accompanied
by a decorated Christmas tree. Id. at 915.
120. Id. at 921, citing Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.3d 792, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867,
587 P.2d 663 (1978).
121. Okrand, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
122. 699 F. Supp. 549 (W.D.Va. 1988).
123. Smith, 699 F. Supp. at 550.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 554.
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case "differs markedly from those in Lynch, 1" 7 Judge Michael
then proceeded to examine the decisions of other post-Lynch dis-
play cases. 2 ' Based upon his reading of Lynch and these prece-
dents, the Judge concluded that the Charlottesville display vio-
lated the effects prong of Lemon."9 In the District Court's view,
the location of the display at the seat of government and the lack
of other seasoned symbols and decorations communicated a mes-
sage of government endorsement of religion.'
IV. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY v. ACLU
Although brought as one case, County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union"' was essentially two separate and distinct
lawsuits involving two separate holiday displays in two different
buildings under the auspices of two different governmental enti-
ties. The facts of the case were simple and relatively undisputed.
Since 1968, Allegheny County 32 has invited various choirs to
participate-in a Christmas carol program. The performances for
the program were scheduled during the weeks preceding the
Christmas holiday and were held in two locations: the rotunda of
the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport and the first floor of
the County Courthouse in an architecturally impressive area
known variously as the Grand Staircase and the Courthouse Gal-
lery/Forum. 33 Each performance consisted of various choirs, typi-
cally high school students, singing both popular songs as well as
127. Id. at 555.
128. These cases included City of Birmingham, City of Chicago, and County of
Allegheny.
129. Id. at 559. The Court, however, did conclude that the display satisfied the pur-
pose and entanglement prongs.
130. Id. at 561-62.
131. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
132. Allegheny County is a county of the second class under the laws of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 3101 et. seq. (1956). Allegheny County
includes metropolitan Pittsburgh and has a population of about 1.4 million people. Inter-
view with G. Thomas, Director, Allegheny County Department of Communications in Pitts-
burgh, (Nov. 27, 1989). Allegheny County government is headed by a three member board of
commissioners. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 3203, 3401(a)(1).
133. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989)
Joint Appendix filed October Term 1988 (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, 88-96), at 157, 163, The
Allegheny County Courthouse was built in 1886. The Courthouse was designed by famed
architect H. R. Richardson and is considered an outstanding example of Romansque Revival
in American architecture. The Courthouse is on the National Register of Historic Places.
Interview with G. Thomas, Director, Allegheny County Department of Communications, in
Pittsburgh, (Nov. 27, 1989).
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religious and secular Christmas carols.'34 The program was annu-
ally dedicated to the universal themes of world peace and brother-
hood and to the memory of the missing in action of the Vietnam
War."3 5 The carol program was publicized by a large banner hung
outside the County Courthouse and by press releases. 3 ' At the
Courthouse, the caroling was broadcast by loudspeakers to the
public at large.
On the steps of the Grand Staircase where the choirs performed
was erected a nativity scene. The nativity scene consisted of the
traditional figures-a wooden stable with the infant Jesus, the Vir-
gin Mary, Joseph, the Three Wise Men, the Shepherds, various an-
imals and an angel holding a banner reading "Gloria in Excelsis
Deo." The figurines ranged in height from three to fifteen in-
ches. 137 The nativity scene was enclosed by a fence and took up a
small area on one of the landings of the Grand Staircase.' 3
The entire area of the Courthouse where the Christmas carol
program was held and the nativity scene was displayed was deco-
rated in traditional Christmas fashion-red and white poinsettia
plants, evergreen trees with red bows and Christmas wreaths.' 39
These decorations were purchased and arranged by the County's
Bureau of Cultural Programs. Other decorations, including
wreaths, trees and Santa Clauses, were displayed by various de-
partments and offices throughout the Courthouse building.'40
Although a nativity scene had been displayed in conjunction
with the choral program since the program's inception, the particu-
lar nativity scene displayed on the steps had only been used as
part of the choral program since 1981.141 This nativity scene was
not owned by the County, but was the property of the Holy Name
Society of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, a Catholic mens' organiza-
tion. Ownership of the creche was noted by a sign in front of the
nativity scene which read: "This display donated by the Holy
134. Joint Appendix at 169.
135. Id. at 160, 175.
136. Id. at 159, 167.
137. Id. at 161, 164.
138. Id. at 186.
139. Id. at 161.
140. Id. at 167. In addition to the Offices of the Board of Commissioners, the Court-
house serves as the offices of the County's Controller, Sheriff, Treasurer and Clerk of
Courts. Also, the Courthouse houses the courtrooms of the Criminal Division as well as the
arbitration section of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Id. at 69.




Other than providing storage space in the basement of the
Courthouse for a short period and a dolly to transport the display
to and from its place of storage, the County had no other involve-
ment with the nativity scene.'4 3 The County provided no special
security, lighting or maintenance for the display. Moreover, the
creche was erected, arranged and disassembled each year by the
moderator of the Holy Name Society without the assistance of
County personnel."
4
In addition to serving as one of the locales for the annual Christ-
mas carol program, the Grand Staircase-Gallery/ Forum Area of
the County Courthouse was used throughout the year for art dis-
plays and for other civic and cultural events and programs.1"
5
Like Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh also permitted a
holiday display to be erected on government property. For a num-
ber of years, the City of Pittsburgh erected a large Christmas tree
on the front steps of the main entrance to the City-County Build-
ing, 14 a government office building located on the block next to
the Allegheny County Courthouse. The tree, which sat upon a
large platform, was decorated with lights and ornaments by City
employees.
Beginning in the early 1980's, the City included a Chanukah me-
norah" 7 as part of its display. The menorah, which was approxi-
mately eighteen feet tall, was owned by a Jewish group named
142. Id.
143. Id. at 165.
144. Id.
145. Id. At the time of commencement of the litigation, artworks made by mentally
handicapped individuals were on display in the Gallery/Forum area of the Courthouse.
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), Joint Ex-
hibit Volume filed October Term 1988 (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, 88-96), at 36.
146. As the name implies, the City-County Building is jointly owned by the City of
Pittsburgh and the County of Allegheny. The two governmental bodies split maintenance
responsibilities for the building. The side of the building having the menorah and Christmas
tree display was the responsibility of the City. Joint Appendix at 194. The City-County
Building houses the offices of the County Register of Wills and Prothonotary, the Civil Divi-
sion of the Court of Common Pleas and the Courtroom and Prothonotary of the Pennsylva-
nia Superior and Supreme Court. The City-County Building also contains most of the offices
of City government, including the Mayor and Council. Joint Appendix at 114.
147. Chanukah is an eight day holiday which commorates the recapture of the Holy
Temple in Jerusalem by the Maccabees in 165 B.C.E. from the Syrian Greeks. In rededicat-
ing the temple, the Maccabees had only enough oil to burn in the Temple's candelabrum or
menorah for one day. Miraculously, the oil burned in the menorah for eight days until new
oil was obtained. Id. at 138-39, 229; Brief for Petitioner Chabad at 4, County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (No. 88-90).
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Chabad ' " and erected adjacent to the display. 14 9
In addition to the tree and menorah, the City's 1986 holiday dis-
play included a separate standing sign setting forth the City's goal
in the year's United Fund campaign, a sign advertising a floral dis-
play at the City's floral conservatory and a sign attached to the
tree platform. The platform sign read:
SALUTE TO LIBERTY
DURING THIS HOLIDAY SEASON, THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH
SALUTES LIBERTY. LET THESE FESTIVE LIGHTS REMIND US
THAT WE ARE THE KEEPERS OF THE FLAME OF LIBERTY AND
OUR LEGACY OF FREEDOM.
RICHARD S. CALIGUIRI, MAYOR18 0
In November, 1986, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
sent letters to the County's Board of Commissioners and the
Mayor of the City requesting removal of the nativity scene and
menorah. 51 In a written response to this letter, the County Com-
missioners disavowed any intent to endorse any particular religion
through the display.152 The Commissioners wrote that the purpose
of the display of the nativity scene, along with other holiday sym-
bols, was simply to express the wish of "Good Will to All Men." '
Similarly, the Mayor's letter rejected the ACLU's demand that the
displays be eliminated.
1 54
B. Lower Court Decisions
On December 10, 1986, the ACLU and several individuals filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin the County of Allegheny
from displaying a nativity scene inside the Courthouse, and the
City of Pittsburgh from displaying a Chanukah menorah outside
the City-County Building. After denying an application for a tem-
porary restraining order, the District Court scheduled a hearing on
148. Chabad is a group or movement within the Orthodox branch of Judaism which
looks for spiritual guidance and leadership from the Lubavitcher Rebbe. Joint Appendix at
228-29.
149. Id. at 207.
150. Brief for Petitioner City of Pittsburgh at 3-4, County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (No. 88-90).
151. Joint Appendix at 89, 104
152. Joint Exhibit Volume at 26-27.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
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a motion for a preliminary injunction.155 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the District Court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction.'
In a brief oral opinion, the district court judge indicated that the
case was controlled by Lynch v. Donnelly.15 7 The District Court
found that the display of the creche and the menorah conveyed no
message of government endorsement and were de minimus in the
context of the application of the Establishment Clause.'58
Subsequent to the hearing on the motion for a preliminary in-
junction, Chabad, which unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in
the case during the preliminary injunction hearing, filed a formal
motion to intervene. The District Court granted Chabad's motion
to intervene and a second hearing was held for the limited purpose
of permitting Chabad to present evidence concerning the
menorah.'
59
By opinion and order dated May 8, 1987, the district court de-
nied the ACLU's motion for a permanent injunction and declara-
tory relief.16 On May 29, 1987, judgment in the case was formally
entered in favor of the County and the City, and an appeal
followed.' 6 '
In a decision dated May 15, 1988, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court.'62 By a vote of
two-to-one, the court of appeals held that the display of a nativity
scene inside the County Courthouse had the effect of endorsing re-
ligion and thus violated the second prong of the three-part estab-
lishment test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.1
63
In reversing the district court's decision, the Third Circuit's
155. Joint Appendix at 3.
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 61.
160. The District Court stated its conclusion denying the requested injunction in
terms of the Lemon test. The Court declared:
Were one to apply the three pronged test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
the plaintiffs have failed to show enough to justify our intervention because we find
that the displays have a secular purpose, their purpose was not to advance or prohibit
religion and they did not create an excessive entanglement of government with reli-
gion. Nor is there evidence that the displays have caused political division.
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) Petition for
Writ of Certiorari filed (U.S. June 14, 1988) (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, 88-96) at 5a.
161. Joint Appendix at 11.
162. American Civil Liberties Union v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (3rd Cir.
1988).
163. Id. at 662.
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panel majority did not rely upon any specific factor in declaring
the dual displays unconstitutional. Instead, the majority listed six
so-called objective "variables" that a court should consider in de-
termining whether the use of a religious symbol in a display on
public property or by a public entity has the effect of advancing or
endorsing religion. 64 These factors were: (1) the location of the
display; (2) whether the display is part of a larger configuration
including nonreligious items; (3) the religious intensity of the dis-
play; (4) whether the display is shown in connection with a general
secular holiday; (5) the degree of public participation in the owner-
ship and maintenance of the display; and (6) the existence of dis-
claimers of public sponsorship of the display. 16 5 Applying these
factors to the facts of record, the Third Circuit panel declared:
"[Tihe only reasonable conclusion is that by permitting the creche
and the menorah to be placed at the buildings the city and the
county have tacitly endorsed Christianity and Judaism and have
therefore acted to advance religion." '6
The dissenting opinion of Judge Weis agreed with the district
court that the Lynch decision "directly addresses and conclusively
resolves the dispute we encounter here. ' 167 The dissent declared
that "irrelevant and inconsequential variations" in the location
and arrangement of a display did not "justify disregarding the
clear spirit of Lynch."16 8 In Judge Weis' view, "the placement of
the creche in the gallery of the Allegheny County Courthouse, ac-
companied by poinsettia plants and evergreens, does not violate
the Establishment Clause simply because plastic Santa Clauses or
reindeer are absent." 69 Judge Weis further opined that inclusion
of the menorah in the City's display "did no more than broaden
the commemoration of the holiday season" and "called attention to
the great pluralism that is the hallmark of religious toleration in
this country.
17 0
On April 19, 1988, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the
County's petition for rehearing before the Court en banc.17 1 Five




167. 842 F.2d at 666 (Weis, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 668.
169. Id. at 670.
170. Id. at 671.
171. Petition for Certiorari of County of Allegheny at 45a.
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Court in banc and the panel's dissenting judge voted in favor of
panel rehearing.172 The County,'73 City'74 and Chabad 75 all filed
petitions for certiorari and the United States Supreme Court
granted all three petitions.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
To say that the Supreme Court was deeply divided in County of
Allegheny 7 ' would probably be an understatement. Five separate
opinions were written in the case.' 77 Moreover, except for only two
sections, Justice Blackmun's opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court was a plurality opinion. 78
Perhaps best illustrating the deep division of the Court over
County of Allegheny was the case's mixed result. By a narrow five
to four margin, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that the nativity scene displayed inside the
Allegheny County Courthouse violated the effects prong of
Lemon. 79 But, by a combined vote of six-to-three, the Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that the display of a Chan-
nukah menorah outside the City-County Building did not have the
effect of endorsing religion.1
8 0
While each of the respective opinions in County of Allegheny is
important, the opinions of Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Ken-
nedy are especially relevant in understanding the Court's peculiar
resolution of the case. Accordingly, each of these opinions will be
separately reviewed.
1. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
Justice Blackmun began his opinion in County of Allegheny by
addressing two important issues. First, the Justice addressed the
172. Id.
173. County of Allegheny, et. al. v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 53 (1988).
174. City of Pittsburgh v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh, Chap-
ter, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
175. Chabad v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 53 (1988).
176. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 3093.
179. Id. The five Justices voting to affirm the judgment were Blackmun, O'Connor,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
180. 109 S. Ct. 15 3093. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined the dissenters on the
judgment on the creche, Kennedy, White, Rehniquist and Scalia, to provide the six votes to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the menorah.
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question of whether the Lemon test should still be used in deciding
Establishment Clause cases. 81 Secondly, he discussed to what ex-
tent Lynch was applicable to the case. 82
Justice Blackmun declared that the Lemon analysis had been
"applied regularly in the Court's later Establishment Clause
cases."' 83 But, in more recent cases, the Justice noted that the
Court's attention had been drawn to determining "whether the
challenged government practice either has the purpose or effect of
'endorsing' religion.'1 8 4
Although the notion of endorsement was of recent vintage, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated that the concept derived its meaning from
language such as "preference," "favoritism" and "promotion" used
in other Establishment Clause cases.88 According to Justice Black-
mun, all of these concepts expressed a similar principle: "The Es-
tablishment Clause . . . prohibits government from appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief or from making ad-
herence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community."' 8
Next, addressing the specific question of the applicability of
Lynch v. Donnelly to the facts at hand, Justice Blackmun rejected
using the rationale of the majority opinion in Lynch. Calling the
majority opinion "none too clear,' 1 87 the Justice instead looked to
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch and the views of
the Lynch dissenters for guidance in evaluating governmental use
of religious symbols.18 8 In Justice Blackmun's view, the concurring
181. 109 S. Ct. at 3100.
182. Id. at 3101.
183. Id. at 3100.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 3101, (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)(no favoritism or
preference for religion); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (preference equated
with endorsement); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (no fa-
voritism among sects); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (no promotion); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (no promotion)).
186. 109 S. Ct. at 3101, (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
187. 109 S. Ct. at 3101. Justice Blackmun stated that the two "strands" of the Lynch
majority opinion were unclear:
First, the opinion states that the inclusion of the creche in the display was "no more
an advancement or endorsement of religion" than other "endorsements" this Court
has approved in the past,-but the opinion offers no discernible measure for distin-
guishing between permissible and impermissible endorsements. Second, the opinion
observes that any benefit the government's display of the creche gave to religion was
no more than "indirect, remote, and incidental."-without saying how or why.
Id. at 3101-02 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 3102.
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and dissenting opinions in Lynch set forth a better analytical
framework than the Lynch majority opinion because the concur-
rence and dissents were ideologically unified under the notion of
endorsement.'8 9 Though diverging on the bottom line, Justice
Blackmun declared that both the concurrence and the dissents in
Lynch would determine governmental endorsement by examining
the physical context of the government's use of a religious sym-
bol.190 With this analytical framework in mind, the Justice stated
that "our present task is to determine whether the display of the
creche and the menorah, in their respective 'particular physical
settings,' has the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious
beliefs." '191
Justice Blackmun first turned his attention to an examination of
the nativity scene display in the County Courthouse. Writing in
this instance for a majority of the Court, he concluded that the
effect of the County display was to endorse Christian doctrine. 92
In support of this conclusion, the Justice made specific reference to
four physical features of the Courthouse display.19 3 First, Justice
Blackmun took note of the language used in the display. The pres-
ence of an angel figurine holding a banner reading "Glory to God
in the Highest," the Justice declared, served only to enhance in
sectarian terms the religious message of the creche.1 94 Second, he
compared the display in Lynch with the display in County of Alle-
gheny. 96 According to Justice Blackmun, the display in Lynch
consisted of a number of figurines and objects arranged to have
sepaiate focal points.196 In this case, the Justice observed that the
creche stood alone with nothing to detract from its religious
message. 1
9 7
Justice Blackmun additionally rejected the County's argument
189! Id. at 3102-03.




194. 109 S. Ct. at 3103. The angel figurine holding the banner was approximately six
inches in height and seven inches wide. The banner was seven-eighths of an inch wide and
was nine inches long. Measurements provided by G. Thomas, Director, Allegheny County
Department of Communications. The inscription on the banner was written in Latin. Joint
Appendix at 94.
195. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
196. Id. at 3104. Justice Blackmun used this focal point theory to reject the County's
argument that the other decorations arranged throughout the Courthouse should also be
considered as part of the display. Id. at 3104 n.48.
197. Id. at 3104.
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that the County's floral decorations around the nativity scene dis-
play and the choral program served as the functional equivalent of
the secular decorations present in Lynch.198 In Justice Blackmun's
view, the floral decorations created a frame which only accentuated
the display's religious message. 99 Furthermore, the Justice de-
clared that the choral program was of too short a duration to ne-
gate the religious effect of the display. 00
A third factor cited by Justice Blackmun as indicating govern-
mental endorsement was the situs of the display.20' The Justice
declared that a display could simply not be located in a prominent
area such as the Courthouse's Grand Staircase for an extended pe-
riod of time without creating an impression of governmental sup-
port and approval.20 2 Justice Blackmun further maintained that
the County's use of press releases and its arrangement of the floral
decorations only confirmed the understanding that any display lo-




199. Id. Justice Blackmun analogized the County Christmas display to an Easter dis-
play of a cross surrounded by lilies. Displays of crosses on public property have generally
been held unconstitutional. See, American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles, 794
F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 961 (1986); American Civil Liberties Union v.
Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Libin v. Town
of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393(D.Conn. 1985); Greater Houston Chapter of A.C.L.U. v.
Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.Tex. 1984); cf. Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners
of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1169
(1986) (cross insignia on County seal); Fox v.City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 2d 792, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 867, 587 P.2d 663 (1978) (building lights forming cross). But see, Eugene Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 Pd. 338 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lowe
v. Eugene Sand & Gravel Inc., 434 U.S. 876 (1977) (cross utilized as war memorial
constitutional).
200. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104. The choral program was presented dur-
ing the lunch hour. Each performance lasted about forty-five minutes to one hour. Joint
Appendix at 182.
201. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
202. Id. at 3104 n.50. The nativity scene was erected on November 26, 1986 and taken
down on January 9, 1987. Joint Appendix at 59, 172.
203. Id. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104 n.50. Justice Blackmun stated that
the press releases associated the County with the creche. The press releases, however, sim-
ply announced the respective groups participating in the choral program and the various
times and dates of performances. The only reference to the nativity scene contained in the
press releases was as follows: "The setting for the holiday festivities at the Courthouse is a
manger set loaned to the County by the Holy Name Society of the Diocese of Pittsburgh,
and fresh greens and poinsettias provided by the Allegheny County Bureau of Cultural Pro-
grams." Joint Exhibit Volume at 36.
Additionally, Justice Blackmun stated that the "County created a visual link between
itself and the creche" by placing two evergreen trees next to official signs directing visitors
to various governmental offices located in the Courthouse. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct.
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Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that the disclaimer sign did not
alter the endorsement effect of the nativity scene display.2 4 Rather
than disclaiming a religious message, the Justice stated that the
sign indicated governmental adoption of the religious message of a
sectarian organization.0 5
In conclusion, Justice Blackmun stated that government could
"acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomena, ' 206 but not ob-
serve the occasion as a Christian holy day. Since the County's cele-
bration of Christmas had "the effect of endorsing a patently Chris-
tian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ, '207 Justice
Blackmun declared that the County's display in this context must
be enjoined.2 08
Before addressing the constitutionality of the City of Pitts-
burgh's menorah display, Justice Blackmun, on behalf of a major-
ity of the Court, presented a lengthy rebuttal to Justice Kennedy's
criticisms in dissent of the Court's decision on the creche. Justice
Blackmun stated that the dissenting opinion grossly misinter-
preted the Court's decision concerning legislative prayer in Marsh
v. Chambers. °e Justice Blackmun maintained that the dissent's
reading of Marsh "would gut the core of the Establishment
Clause" by legitimating unconstitutional practices on the basis of
history.21 0
Justice Blackmun's opinion also took strong exception to the dis-
sent's characterization of the majority's endorsement analysis as "a
jurisprudence of minutiae. 2 1  Justice Kennedy's "proselytization
test," argued Justice Blackmun, was not only as equally a fact spe-
cific inquiry as the endorsement inquiry of the majority but also
created an unacceptable burden of proving governmental favorit-
at 3104 n.50. Justice Kennedy strongly criticized Blackmun's visual link theory. 109 S. Ct. at
3144.
204. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3105.
205. Id. at 3105. To support this argument, Justice Blackmun cited as an example the
case of Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989). In that case, the Court held
that a tax exemption to religious periodicals was an endorsement of the religious beliefs in
these publications.
206. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3105.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id, citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
210. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3106. Justice Blackmun declared that history
contained numerous examples of official governmental endorsement of Christianity. One ex-
ample noted by Justice Blackmun was an 1845 Thanksgiving Proclamation in South Caro-
lina. Id. at 3106 n.53.
211. 109 S. Ct. at 3107.
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ism for a particular sect or creed.2 12 Justice Blackmun declared
that the dissenters' proselytization test was simply an effort to
lower the level of scrutiny of the Court in Establishment Clause
cases.
213
Finally, Justice Blackmun responded to the dissenting opinion's
view that the majority's decision concerning the County nativity
scene display indicated a "latent hostility or callous indifference
toward religion. 2114 Dismissing the dissenters' contention as "offen-
sive" and "absurd," Justice Blackmun stated that the dissenters'
criticism was founded upon the faulty proposition that government
must be permitted to celebrate both the secular and religious as-
pects of the Christmas holiday.2 15 Justice Blackmun declared that
the Constitution mandates that the state remain secular and avoid
discrimination on the basis of religion. Confining the govern-
ment's celebration of Christmas to the holiday's secular aspects,
the Justice stated, would ensure no preference or favoritism of
religion.216
Unlike his statements on the nativity scene, Justice Blackmun's
views on the constitutionality of the City of Pittsburgh's display
were not joined by any other member of the Court. For Justice
Blackmun, the relevant question was whether the City's display,
consisting of a Christmas tree, menorah and a sign, was an en-
dorsement of Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays or sec-
ular events.21 7 After examining each item included in the City's
display, Justice Blackmun concluded that the display did not have
the effect of endorsing a religious faith.1
Justice Blackmun initially examined the City's Christmas tree.
He declared that, unlike the menorah, a Christmas tree was not an
inherently religious symbol.219 Moreover, the overwhelming size of
212. Id. at 3108-09. Justice Blackmun maintained that fact specific inquiries Were a
normal part of the judicial process of interpreting the broad language of the Constitution.
Id. at 3108.
213. Id. at 3109.
214. 109 S. Ct. at 3110.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 3111. While he opened that governmental celebration of Christmas must
remain secular, Justice Blackmun maintained that the religious celebration of the holiday
need not be confined to private property. Thus, commonplace celebrations of the holiday
occurring on public property such as caroling in a park were not constitutional. Id.
217. 109 S. Ct. at 3113.
218. Id. at 3115.
219. Id. Justice Blackmun cited the case of American Civil Liberties Union v. City of
St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) to support his view that a Christmas tree is a
secular holiday symbol. In City of St. Charles, Judge Posner stated that a Christmas tree
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the City's Christmas tree gave further evidence in the Justice's
view that the City display was a secular celebration acknowledging
Chanukah as "a contemporary alternative tradition.
2 0
With respect to the menorah, Justice Blackmun noted that a
secular representation of Chanukah was not a reasonable alterna-
tive.221 Because of the lack of a reasonable alternative, the Justice
concluded that an inference of endorsement which could be drawn
when government uses a religious symbol to serve secular ends was
not present.222
Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that the sign accompanying the
City's display further negated any possible endorsement of a reli-
gious faith.22 He declared that the statements on the sign saluting
liberty and referring to the theme of light demonstrated the secu-
lar nature of the display.24 Thus, in Justice Blackmun's view, the
sign simply confirmed cultural diversity and not an endorsement of
religion.12 5 In view of all of these considerations, Justice Blackmun
concluded that a reasonable observer would not perceive the City's
display as conveying a simultaneous endorsement of the Christian
and Jewish faiths but rather as a "secular recognition of different
traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season. '226 Therefore,
in Justice Blackmun's view, the menorah display did not violate
the effect prong of the Lemon test.2"
2. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion 22 in County of Allegheny
was regarded by most people as a purely decorative symbol. Id. at 271. The secular nature of
the tree has been supported in other cases. See, Lubavitch of Iowa, Inc. v. Walters, 684 F.
Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.Iowa 1988).
While he noted that the Christmas tree was "the preeminent secular symbol of the Christ-
mas holiday season," 109 S. Ct. at 3113, Justice Blackmun declared that this secular symbol
could take on religious significance if decorated with religious objects. Id. at n.65.
220. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3114.
221. Id.
222. Id. According to Justice Blackmun, the only acceptable secular alternative to the
menorah would have been a driedel. A driedal is a child's toy, a four-sided top with Hebrew
letters referring to the Hannukah miracle. Joint Appendix at 241-42.
223. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3114.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 3115.
226. Id.
227. Id. Justice Blackmun left open the possibility that the menorah display violated
the purpose and entanglement prongs. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the menorah
display did not violate either of the remaining prongs. American Civil Liberties Union v.
County of Allegheny, Civil Nos. 87-3395 & 3436 (3rd Cir. September 13, 1989).
228. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3117 (0 Connor, J., concurring).
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had a threefold purpose: one, to give her interpretation of the
meaning of Lynch v. Donnelly; two, to respond to Justice Ken-
nedy's criticisms of her endorsement analysis; and three, to explain
her conclusion as to why the inclusion of a menorah in the City of
Pittsburgh's holiday display was constitutional.
Justice O'Connor declared that her concurrence in Lynch was
based on her understanding that "the creche had to be viewed in
light of the total display of which it was a part." '229 The fact that
the Lynch majority intended the creche to be viewed in its physi-
cal context, Justice O'Connor continued, was evidenced by the ma-
jority opinion's repeated references to the inclusion of the creche
within the larger holiday display.230 Unlike the display in Lynch,
Justice O'Connor noted that the nativity scene in County of Alle-
gheny stood alone in a public area of a core governmental build-
ing." ' Thus, the County Courthouse creche was unconstitutional,
in Justice O'Connor's view, because it conveyed a message that re-
ligion was relevant to one's standing in the political community.232
Justice O'Connor also used her concurring opinion as a vehicle to
vigorously defend her Establishment Clause endorsement analy-
sis.233 The Justice first defended her endorsement test as doctri-
nally sound. She declared that the endorsement test expressed the
essential command of the Establishment Clause that religion
should have no relevance to a person's standing in the political
community. 34 To rely simply upon an Establishment Clause stan-
dard prohibiting coercive governmental practices, Justice
O'Connor argued, was an insufficient protection of religious liberty
229. Id. at 3118.
230. Id. But see infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
231. Id. at 3118-19.
232. Id. at 3119, (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233. This section defending endorsement analysis was joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens. Both have used endorsement analysis in majority opinions which they have author-
ized. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). ("[It is appropriate to ask whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion") (Stevens, J.); Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) ("If this identification conveys a
message of government endorsement or approval of religion, a core purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause is violated.") (Brennan, J.); Edwards v. Aguillard, 480 U.S. 373, 389 (1987).
Justice O'Connor has also utilized her endorsement analysis in numerous cases. See, Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-70, 74-76 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703,711-12 (1985); Witters v. Washington Department of Services, 474 U.S. 481, 106 S. Ct.
748, 744 (1986).
234. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3119. The position of Justice O'Connor tying
endorsement to political rights has not been universally accepted. See, Smith, Symbols, Per-
ceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the No Endorsement Test,
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 307 (1987).
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and diversity because it failed to take into account the numerous,
subtle ways that government can show favoritism or disapproval of
particular beliefs.2 5
In addition to being sound in theory, Justice O'Connor con-
tended that the endorsement test was "capable of consistent appli-
cation. 2 38 Justice O'Connor supported this contention by noting
that all three circuit courts that had considered the constitutional-
ity of an unadorned creche had reached the same result utilizing
her endorsement analysis.2 37 Though admitting that the endorse-
ment test "may not always yield results with unanimous agreement
at the margins, 2 3 18 Justice O'Connor asserted that such was true of
many standards in constitutional law.2 39 Justice Kennedy's modi-
fied coercion test, O'Connor declared, was no different.24
Justice O'Connor further denied that an endorsement test was
inconsistent with prior precedent and traditions because the test's
application created a need to create artificial exceptions in order to
legitimate many long-standing governmental acknowledgments of
religion in public life.241 The Justice stated that these examples of
ceremonial deism did not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny
because of their historical longevity. Rather, the Justice declared,
the longevity and ubiquity of these practices or acts of ceremonial
deism were factors that were relevant in evaluating whether the
practices or acts convey a message of endorsement.242
235. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3119. The lack of coercion was raised by the
City and the County to support the displays in the case. See Reply Brief for County of
Allegheny and City of Pittsburgh, at 1-6. In his opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court, Justice Blackmun specifically declined to consider this factor, 109 S. Ct. at 3103 n.47,
relying instead upon dicta in other cases wherein the lack of coercion was not viewed as a
requirement for finding an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 3103 n.47, (citing Commit-
tee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)). Justice
O'Connor also declined to reconsider coercion as a factor because she felt that it would
make the Free Exercise Clause redundant. 109 S. Ct. at 3119. But see, Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PT. L. REv. 673 (1980).
236. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3120.
237. Id. at 3120. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d
655 (3rd Cir. 1988), American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir.
1987), ACLU v. Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939
(1986). But see supra, notes 91 to 99 and accompanying text for discussion of McCreary v.
Stone.
238. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3120.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. The practices cited by Justice O'Connor were legislative prayers and opening
court with "God Save the United States and this honorable Court". Id.
242. Id. at 3121.
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Additionally, Justice O'Connor responded to the charge that the
application of the endorsement test in this case reflected a hostility
toward religion. She agreed that government can acknowledge the
role of religion in modern society and that government was consti-
tutionally obligated to accommodate religion in particular cases.'
Justice O'Connor argued, however, that Justice Kennedy's inter-
changeable use of the terms "acknowledgment" and "accommoda-
tion" ignored the essential fact that the placement of a nativity
scene was not necessary to remove a governmentally imposed bur-
den on religion.24'
Finally, although she agreed with Justice Blackmun's conclu-
sions that the City's inclusion of a menorah in its holiday display
was constitutional, Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with Jus-
tice Blackmun's reasoning concerning this display. She contended
that Justice Blackmun's inquiry into whether the City's display
was a dual endorsement of Christianity and Judaism was mistaken
because it downgraded the religious significance of both the meno-
rah and the holiday of Chanukah itself.24 5 Additionally, Justice
O'Connor contended that Justice Blackmun's "double endorse-
ment or secular acknowledgment of the winter holiday season" in-
correctly intimated that an endorsement of a minority faith was
not possible.4 6 In Justice O'Connor's view, a menorah standing
alone was capable of sending a message of endorsement just as the
creche in the County Court House standing alone sent a message
of endorsement. 247 Further, the Justice strongly disagreed with
Justice Blackmun's statements concerning the necessity of the use
of a more secular alternative to the display of religious symbols.
Justice O'Connor labeled this rule as "irrelevant" and criticized it
"too blunt an instrument for Establishment Clause analysis, which
depends on sensitivity to the context and circumstances presented
243. Id.
244. Id. at 3121-22. The term accommodation can be used in two ways. The first usage
would relate to seeking an exemption from some governmental regulation or practice that
has a significantly harmful impact on the religious practice of an individual. This usage
relates primarily to the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishops v.
Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 408 U.S. 136, 107
S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The second usage of the term
accommodation would refer to efforts to facilitate the exercise of religion in public life or the
recognition of religion in public life through the display of symbols. See, Developments in
the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1606, 1641-44 (1987). Justice Ken-
nedy's use of the term accommodation is clearly with reference to the latter meaning.
245. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3122.
246. Id. at 3135.
247. Id. at 3123.
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by each case."' 4" Instead, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
City's display "did not endorse Judaism or religion in general, but
rather conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief dur-
ing the holiday season."' 9
3. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
Like Justice Blackmun's plurality/majority opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy's dissenting opinion also began with a discussion of the
Lemon test.2"" Justice Kennedy observed that the Lemon frame-
work had received "persuasive criticism."2 5' Despite such criticism,
the Justice nevertheless declared that Lemon need not be recon-
sidered at this time. In Justice Kennedy's view, the Lemon test,
"applied with proper sensitivity to our traditions and caselaw,"
satisfactorily resolved the issues presented by County of
Allegheny.
2 52
Although he specifically disavowed any attempt to change
Lemon, Justice Kennedy nevertheless presented an alternative to
Lemon. The Justice stated that government policies of accommo-
dation, acknowledgment and support of religion were an accepted
part of American political and cultural life. 53 According to Justice
Kennedy, governmental latitude in recognizing and accommodat-
ing religion under the Establishment Clause was limited by two
factors: one, a prohibition on government coercion to support or
participate in any religion; and two, a prohibition of direct benefits
which establishes or tends to establish a religion.
2 54
Addressing initially the necessity of governmental coercion, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that case law evidenced without exception
that the Court would invalidate coercive government conduct fur-
thering religious interests.2 5 While he acknowledged that the dicta
of recent cases rejected the need to show coercion to prove an Es-
248. Id. at 3124.
249. Id. at 3123.
250. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1988).
251. Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 4 to 5 and accompany-
ing text.
252. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 3135.
254. Id. at 3136.
255. Id. The examples cited by Justice Kennedy were: (1) compelling attendance at
religious activities, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); (2) requiring religious oaths to obtain gov-
ernmental office or benefits, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); and (3) delegating
government power to religious groups, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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tablishment Clause violation, Justice Kennedy stated that these
cases were of limited applicability because they dealt only with the
necessity of proving direct governmental coercion. 256 According to
Justice Kennedy, passive or symbolic accommodation of religion,
absent some showing of coercion, posed little danger to religious
liberty.5 7
Concerning the second factor of the establishment of religion,
the Justice referred to the permissible church-state contacts cited
in the Lynch and Marsh cases. In Justice Kennedy's view, these
cases recognized that symbolic acknowledgment of religion and
traditional acts of assistance of religion conferred no substantial
benefit upon religion.2 58 Thus, Justice Kennedy opined that a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause would require the demonstra-
tion of a benefit to religion "more direct and more substantial than
practices that are accepted in our national heritage.
'259
Applying these factors of coercion and benefit to the facts
presented in County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy declared that
the two holiday displays at issue were constitutional.6 0 He noted
preliminarily that the County's and City's interests in celebrating
the season and acknowledging the religious aspects of the holiday
fell well within the nation's tradition of governmental acknowledg-
ment and accommodation.26' Justice Kennedy further declared
that an enforced recognition of only the secular elements of the
holiday would signify "a callous indifference" toward religion.262
The Justice observed that there was no evidence of governmental
coercion concerning the two displays.6 3 Additionally, Justice Ken-
nedy stated that Lynch was dispositive of the question whether a
256. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3137.
257. Id. Justice Kennedy did concede that religious symbols can be used in a coercive
manner. As an example, Justice Kennedy referred to the permanent erection of a cross on
the roof of city hall. Id. The display of crosses on public property has been the subject of
numerous court challenges. See supra, note 199.
258. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3137-38.
259. Id. at 3138.
260. Id. at 3139.
261. Id. at 3138, (citing Brief for Petitioner, County of Allegheny, at p. 27. Justice
Kennedy took issue with the majority's contention that the creche display could not be
"justified as an accommodation of religion because the display did not remove a burden on
the exercise of Christianity." Justice Kennedy declared that limits of permissible state ac-
commodations of religion are not coextensive with the non-interference with religion re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause. 109 S. Ct. at 3138 n.2. (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 3138.
263. Id. at 3139.
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creche or menorah represented a serious risk of establishment of
religion.26
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy rejected the principal arguments
advanced to distinguish the Lynch display from the displays in
County of Allegheny. Justice Kennedy stated that the differences
in the physical arrangements of the particular displays were unim-
portant."6 5 The crucial fact in Lynch, Justice Kennedy declared,
was not the physical features of the display but the recognition
that a seasonal display of a creche itself simply poses no danger of
the establishment of religion.2 66 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy de-
clared that the location of the displays on public as opposed to
private property was equally inconsequential.2 7 The Justice ob-
served that not only did the Lynch decision never suggest that use
of public property converted permissible governmental conduct
into an Establishment Clause violation, but also that the First
Amendment may require access to government property by reli-
gious groups.26s
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion also took strong exception
to Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis. He criticized the en-
dorsement test as flawed both as a concept and in its applica-
tion.26 9 According to Justice Kennedy, any standard for deciding
Establishment Clause issues must comport with precedent and
traditional practices.2 70 Thus, the Justice declared any test which
invalidated well-established traditions and practices was simply an
improper reading of the Establishment Clause.27' Justice Kennedy
further stated that the endorsement test was flawed because few of
the traditional governmental practices acknowledging the role of
religion in modern society could withstand scrutiny under this
test.
272
Citing numerous examples of official recognition of religion, Jus-
tice Kennedy observed that some endorsement was inherent in all
264. Id.
265. Id. at 3139-40.
266. Id. at 3140.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3141.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 3141-42. Justice Kennedy conceded that the practice of having public holi-
day displays was of recent vintage. But Justice Kennedy maintained that a practice need
not date back to the founding of the County in order to be constitutional. Justice Kennedy
declared that Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1982), did not carve out an exception but
rather stood for the broad proposition that history and understanding are the determinent




these practices.2 73 The end result of the endorsement test, in Jus-
tice Kennedy's view, was an unacceptable choice between invali-
dating scores of traditional practices recognizing religion in Ameri-
can life or creating numerous exceptions to the rule for these
traditional practices while invalidating other public practices of
less duration with no greater endorsement effect.
2 74
Justice Kennedy also argued that the application of the endorse-
ment test threatened to trivialize constitutional adjudication. Jus-
tice Kennedy declared that the majority had embraced a "jurispru-
dence of minutiae" which would require courts to examine displays
in exhaustive detail to determine their constitutionality. 275 This
"unguided examination of marginalia," Justice Kennedy contin-
ued, was "irreconcilable with the imperative of applying neutral
principles in constitutional adjudication.
'2 76
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy opined that the majority's ap-
proach in County of Allegheny contradicted the values of accom-
modation and acknowledgment implicit in the Establishment
Clause. 77 Labeling the majority's efforts to limit governmental ac-
knowledgment of religion as "an Orwellian rewriting of history,"
Justice Kennedy declared that communities should be free to
make reasonable judgments regarding the accommodations and ac-
knowledgment of the cultural and religious aspects of holidays.278
V. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF HOLIDAY DISPLAYS
A. The Rewriting of Lynch
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch was subjected
to extensive criticism, the basic message of the case seemed rela-
273. Id. at 3142-43. These examples included Thanksgiving Day proclamations, which
have established a national day of celebration and prayer, courtroom opening ceremonies,
prayer rooms in Congress, Prayer Day proclamations, the phrase "one Nation under God" in
the Pledge of Allegience, the "In God We Trust" motto and legislative prayers. Id. at 3142-
43.
274. Id. at 3144. In addition to the traditional acknowledgements of religion in public
life, Justice Kennedy declared that the endorsement test would eliminate the singing of
religious Christmas carols on public property. Justice Kennedy argued that the explicit reli-
gious lyrics of these carols would certainly alienated non-adherents. Justice Kennedy con-
cluded: "Like Thanksgiving Proclamations, the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,
and invocations to God in sessions of Congress and of this Court, they constitute practices
that the Court will not proscribe, but that the Court's reasoning today does not explain." Id.
at 3144 n.10.
275. Id. at 3144.
276. Id. at 3145.




tively clear: In the context of the holiday season, holiday displays
with religious symbols do not violate the Establishment Clause. In
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 9 the Su-
preme Court provided a new interpretation of Lynch. This new in-
terpretation emphasized the physical rather than the seasonal con-
text of a display. The majority's attempt in County of Allegheny
to place a fact-specific, physical context interpretation on Lynch is
strained and unconvincing for several reasons.
Both Justices Blackmun and O'Connor repeated Chief Justice
Burger's detailed description of the Pawtucket display in an at-
tempt to emphasize the importance of the physical setting to the
Lynch decision.2 80 But other than his initial description of the
Pawtucket display, Chief Justice Burger never again mentioned
the secular decorations, let alone attributed any special signifi-
cance to their presence.
Additionally, Justice Blackmun cited the particular floral ar-
rangement surrounding the Courthouse creche, the limited length
of the choral program and the sign disclosing the ownership of the
creche to support his contention that the County did not do
enough to detract from or negate the message of endorsement con-
veyed by the creche. 81 But this assertion that the secular decora-
tions and figurines were necessary to cover up the religious mean-
ing of the creche is expressly contradicted in Lynch. Both Chief
Justice Burger's and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Lynch specifi-
cally disavowed that secular decorations were necessary to camou-
flage the religious significance of the creche. Chief Justice Burger
declared that the Lynch decision did not seek to explain away the
religious significance of the creche or to equate a religious symbol
with secular decorations.8 2 More pointedly, Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Lynch stated that the presence of secular
decorations did not drain or nullify the religious and sectarian sig-
nificance of the creche.283
279. 109 S. Ct. 3146 (1989).
280. Id. at 3102, 3117.
281. Id. at 3104-05. In comparing the Lynch display, Justice Blackmun espoused a
"focal point" theory to support his contention that the Courthouse display was too intensely
religious. The description of the arrangement of the Lynch display provided by the district
court indicate that all of the items in the display were not located in one central area but
were spread throughout the park area. See Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1155. Arguably, the
multiple points of the various items in the Lynch display were so far apart that they could
not detract from the religious message of the creche.
282. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
283. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Finally, the Court in County of Allegheny disregarded the ex-
plicit instructions contained in Lynch regarding the proper analyt-
ical framework for determining the constitutionality of a public
display of a religious symbol. In County of Allegheny, Justice
Blackmun declared that the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Lynch provided the relevant constitutional principles to govern the
case and the applicable principle was that the effect of the govern-
ment's use of religious symbolism depends upon its physical set-
ting.28 4 This mysterious interpretation of Lynch by Justice Black-
mun, however, completely ignores the statements that the context
of the season was the applicable governing principle. Twice in his
opinion, Chief Justice Burger referred in Lynch to "the creche in
the context of the Christmas season."2 5 The Chief Justice
concluded:
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol-the creche-at the very time
people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in
public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and legisla-
tures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would be a stilted over-
reaction contrary to our history and our holdings." 6
Justice O'Connor also disregarded "the context of the season"
standard articulated by the Lynch majority. Justice O'Connor jus-
tified her change in position on the creche display in County of
Allegheny by maintaining that her concurring opinion in Lynch
was premised on the Lynch majority's recognition of the necessity
of viewing the creche in light of the total display of which it was a
part.287 Justice O'Connor supported her interpretation of Lynch by
citing the repeated references made in the majority opinion to "the
inclusion of the creche. 2 8 While Justice O'Connor's explanation
of her changed vote in County of Allegheny is defensible, it never-
theless ignores that her concurring opinion also employed a "con-
text of the season" standard. Justice O'Connor stated:
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the
district court found, is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday
setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display-as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious
284. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103.
285. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80.
286. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
287. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3118.
288. Id., (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 680-82, 686).
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content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that
context. 8 '
Clearly, a fair reading of the Lynch decision does not support the
majority's fact-specific, physical context interpretation in County
of Allegheny of the Lynch decision.
B. The Endorsement Test: Will it Work for the Holiday Displays?
In writing about the Lynch decision, some commentators ac-
cused the Supreme Court of creating a plastic reindeer rule.29 0 Ac-
cording to these Lynch critics, the Supreme Court tacitly adopted
such a rule to govern public displays of religious symbols by sug-
gesting that a display of a religious symbol would not violate the
Establishment Clause if it was accompanied by secular objects and
secular Christmas figurines subduing the religious element of the
display.
If the Court in County of Allegheny had adopted a plastic rein-
deer rule, then perhaps the decision might not have been so disap-
pointing. At least with a plastic reindeer rule, there would have
been a clear and predictable basis for determining the constitu-
tionality of holiday displays. Instead, by rewriting Lynch and opt-
ing for Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, an approach
which looks to all of the circumstances regarding a display,9 the
Court has regrettably embarked on a course destined to produce
even more confusion and uncertainty over public holiday displays
than existed after Lynch. The uncertainty and confusion bound to
be created under the Supreme Court's new formula for holiday dis-
plays, an analysis which can be labelled as "beyond the plastic
reindeer rule," can best be illustrated by several examples sug-
gested by the Court's analysis in County of Allegheny.
In County of Allegheny, Justice Blackmun observed that the lo-
cation of a display on public property does not make the display
unconstitutional per se.2 92 Justice O'Connor, however, seemed to
adopt the position advanced by the American Civil Liberties Union
and hinted that the location of a creche at a core governmental
building was a significant factor in making the Allegheny County
289. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
290. See Note, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 477, 495 (1986); Note, Lynch v.
Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CoM. L.REV. 185, 202 n.193
(1985).
291. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Courthouse display unconstitutional. 293 Since Justice O'Connor's
views in this area have been of crucial importance, the issue of
what constitutes a core government building would seem to be of
importance. But the Court provides no guidance as to what consti-
tutes a core function of government. Is it a park? An airport? A
nursing facility? Ironically, the Court has eschewed such a core
function standard as unworkable in other cases, but indirectly sug-
gests its significance in cases involving religious displays.2 94
Another example of the uncertainty promoted by the "beyond
plastic reindeer rule" analysis is the indoor versus outdoor location
of a display. After Lynch, one of the unsettled questions was
whether the display of a religious symbol could be located on pub-
lic property.2 95 After County of Allegheny, one must ask whether
the Court has implicitly adopted an inside/outside display ration-
ale. The display in Lynch which was constitutional was an outdoor
display; the display inside the Courthouse in County of Allegheny
was unconstitutional while the display outside the City-County
Building was constitutional.
Still another example from the County of Allegheny case illus-
trating the difficulty of applying the physical context standard of
the reindeer rule is holiday floral decorations. Under the analysis
of both Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in County of Allegheny,
the display of a Christmas tree is most likely constitutional.296
However, the specific items decorating the tree, if religious in na-
ture, could create an Establishment Clause problem. In County of
Allegheny, the large Christmas tree near the menorah display was
permissible; on the other hand, smaller evergreen trees surround-
ing the creche created a visual link between government and the
religious meaning of the creche.297 Does this mean that in future
cases not only the arrangement but also the size of the floral deco-
rations in a display is an important factor in determining the dis-
play's constitutionality?
Although these examples seem facetious, they illustrate the seri-
ous flaw in the approach chosen by the Court in County of Alle-
293. Id. at 3119.
294. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
In Garcia, the Court rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" a func-
tion standard for purposes of determining state regulatory immunity under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 546-47.
295. See supra, note 59.
296. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3113, 3122.
297. Id. at 3104 n.50. See also supra, note 203.
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gheny. Under the physical context approach adopted by the Court,
variations in the location, arrangement and content of a holiday
display must be intensively scrutinized to determine their endorse-
ment effect. Moreover, these factors must be examined from the
perspective of "a reasonable observer." Though couched in objec-
tive terms, the analysis required under this approach is invariably
subjective and indeterminate.2 98 Nothing is of special importance;
therefore, everything is relevant. If everything is relevant, a court
can look to no one factor as dispositive. Inevitably, a court's view
of the jumble of variations in location, arrangement and content
results in what Judge Easterbrook described in the City of Chicago
case as an announcement of gestalt, 9 an expression of personal
preference and feeling and not the application of a constitutional
rule.
Under the Lynch analysis, a seasonal context standard made an
inquiry into the minutiae of location, arrangement and content of a
holiday display inconsequential. Thus, while the basic rationale of
the standard of Lynch could be criticized on policy grounds, the
rationale of Lynch was capable of consistent application in future
cases and avoided the necessity of artificially elevating trifling de-
tails about the particulars of a municipality's display into matters
of high and vital constitutional importance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the uncertainty and confusion caused by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, it was hoped that the
Court would settle once and for all the question of the constitu-
tionality of the public display of religious symbols by setting forth
a bright line rule to govern such displays. Rather than providing a
rule, even one like the so-called "plastic reindeer rule," the Court
provided an indeterminate analytical framework where everything
is relevant but nothing is singularly decisive. In short, by going be-
yond the "plastic reindeer rule," the Court has made answering the
question of what type of display of religious symbols under govern-
mental auspices is constitutionality permissible even more difficult
than after Lynch, and has made likely the possibility of more con-
troversy, litigation and inconsistent results in this sensitive area.
298. See, Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neu-
trality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 293, 316 (1987).
299. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1986),
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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